To provide perspective on the long-term – if now attenuated – U.S. In the United States an attempt is being made to initiate a broader debate over whether forward-based nuclear weapons are essential to the integrity of NATO and the deterrence of Russia. drastically cut back on the deployments.Ĭontroversy has surrounded the nuclear deployments for years, especially in Germany and a debate has resumed there, begun mainly by Greens and Social Democrats, over whether that country should spend large sums on modernizing its nuclearcapable military aircraft or whether nuclear weapons should even be based in Germany. had thousands of nuclear weapons in NATO Europe, with the late 1960s a peak in the range of 8,000, but when the Cold War ended the U.S. Before the early 1990s, however, the U.S. The current numbers of nuclear bombs and their locations is an official secret, although it is widely understood that about 100 to 150 bombs are kept at air bases in Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey. support, rejected an appeal for information on U.S. nuclear weapons deployed and their locations in NATO Europe was classified secret during the Cold War and has remained so (for example, in 2018 the Netherlands Council of State, with U.S. Much about the U.S.-NATO nuclear enterprise has been secret since its inception. According to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Alfred Gruenther, it would take time before Europeans saw the bomb as a “conventional means and they stop being afraid of it.” But NATO’s endorsement of MC 48 did not mean widespread acceptance of its ideas in Western Europe. The deployments were consistent with policy priorities established in late 1954 by NATO Military Committee document 48, which mandated nuclear weapons use in conflict with the Soviet Union, including a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe. Thus, President Eisenhower’s “emergency actions pouch” (later known as the “football”) would include a directive authorizing the transfer of nuclear weapons to NATO forces. president had a controlling voice in decisions to use American nuclear weapons. In other circumstances, use of the weapons required the consent of NATO’s top policymaking body, the North Atlantic Council. CINCEUR could order the immediate use of the weapons by NATO. was seeking to store nuclear weapons in Europe and to obtain “the use rights which we require,” it “must be prepared to pay some price.” Part of the price that Washington decided to pay was to develop arrangements that have been in place for decades: training NATO allies to use nuclear weapons delivery systems and making available nuclear weapons for use by alliance forces in the event of war. At the time, State Department officials believed that as long as the U.S. military has stored nuclear weapons at military bases on the territory of its European NATO allies for use in the event of conflict with the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation. Since the mid-1950s, during the Dwight D. Part I: from MC-48 to the Atomic Stockpile System, 1954-1960 Nuclear Presence in Western Europe, 1954-1962 Stockpile issues are still being debated today in parts of Europe, particularly in Germany. should have full freedom to deploy its arsenal at will. President Dwight Eisenhower did not oppose sharing possession of nuclear capabilities – in order to strengthen NATO and reduce dependence on the U.S. Along with allied perspectives, the documents describe inter-agency disputes between State and Defense over issues such as whether to grant certain allies custody over the weapons. Much about this topic is still classified. Today’s posting provides a significant window into the delicate issues surrounding the creation and management of the nuclear stockpile in Europe. In one important new document reporting on a sensitive North Atlantic Council meeting from October 1960, the Greeks wondered whether the Americans would consult with their allies before resorting to nuclear war, while the French, who wanted their own force de frappe, told the group their worry was Washington might not use their weapons at all in a crisis. Other governments, notably France, did raise concerns but sometimes very different ones. The governments in Bonn and Rome made no objections when Washington came calling and did not even pose questions about when or how the weapons might be used. wishes regarding the storage of nuclear weapons on their soil – and ultimately their potential use in a European war, according to newly released State Department and Defense Department records posted today by the nongovernmental National Security Archive. Washington D.C., J– In the 1950s and 1960s, some NATO allies, notably West Germany and Italy, were remarkably compliant to U.S. FOIA Advisory Committee Oversight Reports.
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